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Abstract—Formal analyses of blockchain protocols have re-
ceived much attention recently. Consistency results of Nakamoto’s
blockchain protocol are often expressed in a quantity c, which
denotes the expected number of network delays before some block
is mined. With µ (resp., ν) denoting the fraction of computational
power controlled by benign miners (resp., the adversary), where
µ+ν = 1, we prove for the first time that to ensure the consistency
property of Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol in an asynchronous
network, it suffices to have c to be just slightly greater than
2µ
ln(µ/ν)
. Such a result is both neater and stronger than existing
ones. In the proof, we formulate novel Markov chains which
characterize the numbers of mined blocks in different rounds.
Keywords—Blockchain, consistency, asynchronous networks,
Markov chains.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol [1] supports the Bitcoin
application and relies on the proof of work (POW). POW
means that to create a block, a player needs to provide a
solution of a cryptographic puzzle based on hash functions.
Formal analyses of the protocol have received considerable
interest recently [2]–[5].
Garay, Kiayas and Leonardos [2] propose the first formal
modeling for Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol. They also iden-
tify conditions which enable Nakamoto’s protocol to achieve
a common prefix-property, where honest players’ blockchain
views have a large common prefix.
The model of [2] assumes a synchronous network. Remov-
ing such a strong assumption, Pass, Seeman, and Shelat [3]
consider an asynchronous network by allowing the adversary
to adaptively and individually delay messages up to a delay
limit ∆. We refer to this as the ∆-delay model.
One of the desired properties in a blockchain protocol
is consistency. In this paper, we follow [3], [6] to define
consistency as the property that for any positive integer T ,
with overwhelming probability in T , for any two rounds r and
s with r < s, all but the last T blocks in the chain of any honest
player i at round r is a prefix of the chain of any honest player
j at round s. For an event to have an overwhelming probability
in T , the probability of its complementary event should decay
at least exponentially with respect to T .
Consistency results of Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol are
typically expressed in a quantity c defined as 1pn∆ , where p
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Fig. 1: A comparison of our consistency result with consistency
and attack of [3] by Pass, Seeman, and Shelat (PSS) in
Eurocrypt 2017. We adopt n = 105 and ∆ = 1013 from
Figure 1 of [3]. c denoting 1pn∆ roughly means the expected
number of network delays before some block is mined. See
Table I on Page 2 for the meanings of the notation.
denotes the hardness of the proof of work, n is the number
of players, and ∆ is the maximum delay of a message by
the adversary (the notation will be summarized in Table I on
Page 2). Roughly speaking, c means the expected number of
network delays before some block is mined.
In this paper, we present a result for the consistency
property of Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol. Our result is
stronger than all existing results in the literature. Under the
∆-delay model, with µ (resp., ν) denoting the fraction of
computational power controlled by benign miners (resp., the
adversary), where µ+ ν = 1 and 0 < ν < µ, we show that it
suffices to achieve consistency for c denoting 1pn∆ to be just
slightly greater than 2µln(µ/ν) . Our work is the first one in the
literature to derive such a neat expression 2µln(µ/ν) . Moreover,
we will explain the superiority of our consistency result over
existing results.
In the proof, we formulate two novel Markov chains. With
a state of a round characterizing the number of mined blocks
(e.g., no, one, or over one mined block), our first Markov
chain models the transition of a variable denoting the suffix of
the concatenation of the previous states and the current state.
Our second Markov chain models the transition of a variable
which denotes the concatenation of i) the suffix of previous
states before the ∆ to last state, ii) the previous ∆ states, and
iii) the current state.
We compare our consistency result with [3] and use Fig-
ure 1 on Page 1 to illustrate the comparison. We use n = 105
and ∆ = 1013 from Figure 1 of [3]. We plot the allowed
maximum value for the fraction ν of computational power
controlled by the adversary with respect to c, the expected
number of network delays before some block is mined, in order
to not break consistency.
The magenta line of Figure 1 shows our consistency result.
From the condition c > 2µln(µ/ν) =
2(1−ν)
ln 1−νν
, our maximal νmax
can be solved numerically given c (strictly speaking, νmax
cannot be achieved due to the strict inequality sign). This gives
the magenta line.
The blue line of Figure 1 is from the consistency analysis
of [3]. The consistency condition of [3] is α[1− (2∆+2)α] >
β, where α := 1−(1−p)µn and β := νnp. Roughly speaking,
α ≈ µnp and 2∆ + 2 ≈ 2∆, so α[1 − (2∆ + 2)α] > β is
approximately 1− 2∆µnp > ν1−ν , where we note µ = 1− ν.
Then we further obtain p < 1−2ν2(1−ν)2∆n and hence c :=
1
pn∆ >
2(1−ν)2
1−2ν . This implies ν <
1
2 (2− c+
√
c2 − 2c), where c > 2.
The blue line of Figure 1 shows this.
The red line of Figure 1 illustrates an attack of [3] which
breaks consistency. Remark 8.5 of [3] presents an attack
which works when 1c >
1
ν − 11−ν . This inequality means
ν > 2c+1−
√
4c2+1
2 .
From Figure 1, the magenta line illustrating our consistency
result is strictly above the blue line for consistency of [3].
Hence, our consistency result is much stronger than that of [3]
in the sense that our result tolerates much more fraction of
adversarial computational power. A future direction is to see
whether it is possible to reduce the gap between the magenta
line for our consistency result and the red line representing an
attack on consistency from [3].
Organization of this paper. In Section II, we survey
related studies. Section III explains the model for Nakamoto’s
blockchain protocol. Section IV presents our results for the
consistency property of Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol. In
Sections V and VI, we provide the proof of Theorems 1 and 2,
respectively. We conclude the paper in Section VII. Additional
proof details are given in the Appendix.
Notation. Table I lists the notation and their meanings.
II. RELATED WORK
The essence of blockchain is a consensus protocol to
achieve agreement among distributed nodes. The seminal
blockchain protocol by Nakamoto [1] leads to the popular
application of Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency whose
ledger is maintained by the public instead of trusted authorities.
Table I: Notation and their meanings.
NotationMeanings
p the hardness of the proof of work
n
the number of miners (either honest or corrupted),
each with identical computing power
∆ the maximum delay of a message by the adversary
c
c := 1pn∆ . Roughly speaking, c means the expected
number of ∆-delays before some block is mined.
µ
the fraction of computational power controlled by
benign miners (i.e., the fraction of benign miners)
ν
the fraction of computational power controlled by
the adversary (i.e., the fraction of corrupted miners)
α
α denotes the probability that some honest miner
succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round.
α = 1− (1− p)µn.
α
α denotes the probability that no honest miner
succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round.
α = (1− p)µn.
α1
α1 denotes the probability that only one honest
miner succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round.
α1 = pµn× (1− p)µn−1.
Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol is built on the proof of
work (POW) [1]. When a node creates a block, the node should
provide a solution of a cryptographic puzzle based on hash
functions. Every node maintains its own chain and accepts the
longest chain of the ones it receives from the network.
Recently, formal analyses of blockchain protocols have
received considerable attention [2]–[5]. Three commonly an-
alyzed properties are consistency, chain growth, and chain
quality.
In [1], [2], consistency is defined as the property that with
overwhelming probability in T , at any round, the chains of
two honest players can differ only in the last T blocks. Pass,
Seeman, and Shelat [3] identify that this definition is not
sufficient for consensus, since it does not exclude a protocol
which oscillates between different chains. Hence, they require
an additional property, referred to as future self-consistence:
with overwhelming probability in T , at any two rounds r and s,
the chains of any honest player at r and s differs only in blocks
within the last T blocks. The consistency notion used in [6]
and our current paper combines the consistency definition
of [1], [2] and future self-consistence of [3]. Specifically, by
consistency, we mean that with overwhelming probability in
T , for any two rounds r and s with r < s, all but the last
T blocks in the chain of any honest player i at round r is a
prefix of the chain of any honest player j at round s.
In addition to consistency analyzed by [1]–[3], [6], chain
growth and chain quality for Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol
are also studied in the literature [3], [4], [7]–[9]. The chain
growth is at least g if with overwhelming probability in T ,
the chain of honest players grew by at least T blocks in
the last T/g rounds. The chain quality is at least q if with
overwhelming probability in T , for any T consecutive blocks
in any chain held by some honest player, the fraction of blocks
2
contributed by honest players is at least q. In this paper, we
analyze only consistency. A future direction is to investigate
how to use our proof methods for the analyses of chain growth
and chain quality.
After POW, blockchain protocols based on an alternative
paradigm called the Proof of Stake (POS) have also been
proposed [10]–[13]. POS typically consumes less computation
power than POW. The ingenious Algorand protocol [14] com-
bines POS and the classical practical Byzantine fault tolerance
(PBFT) protocol of [15]. We refer interested readers to recent
surveys [16], [17] for more details of POW, POS, and other
types of blockchain protocols.
III. THE MODEL FOR NAKAMOTO’S BLOCKCHAIN
PROTOCOL
As in many blockchain studies, we adopt the formalization
of Garay, Kiayas and Leonardos [2] and Pass, Seeman, and
Shelat [3] for Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol. We will mostly
follow the notation of [6], which presents a clear explanation
of the formalization.
A blockchain is a pair of algorithms (Π,ext). The stateful
algorithmΠ maintains a local state variable C and also receives
a security parameter κ as an input. The variable C is commonly
referred to as the chain, since it contains a set of blocks.
A block is an abstract record containing a message. The
algorithm ext(κ, C) outputs an ordered sequence of messages.
The execution of a blockchain protocol (Π,ext) is di-
rected by an environment Z(1κ). It activates each of n players
as either honest or corrupt. All n players have identical
computing power. Each honest player has a current view of
the blockchain and aims to build blocks at the end of the
chain. Each corrupted player is controlled by an adversary A.
We consider that at any point, A can corrupt an honest party
or uncorrupt a corrupted player, but the fraction of corrupted
players is at most ν. For ease of analysis, we can just consider
the worst case that A controls ν fraction of corrupted players
at each round.
We consider the network to be asynchronous, and allow
the adversary A to have the following capabilities:
① A can delay and/or reorder all messages up to a delay
of ∆ rounds, but A cannot modify messages sent by honest
players.
① A fully controls all corrupted players; i.e., A reads all their
inputs/messages and sets their outputs/messages to be sent.
Strategies taken by the adversaryA can be letting all corrupted
players to work on the same block or different ones.
All players have access to a random function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ through the following two oracles.
First, H(x) simply outputs H(x). Second, the verification
oracle H.ver(x, y) outputs 1 if and only if H(x) = y and 0
otherwise. How H and H.ver can be accessed is specified as
follows:
• In each round, the players, as well as the adversary A, make
any number of queries to H.ver.
• In each round, each honest player can make only a single
query H and the queries made by honest players are parallel
so that even if they manage to mine several blocks, their
longest chain can increase by at most 1. In contrast, the
adversary A controlling q players can make q sequential
queries to H.
The above model captures that we account for only the effort
of finding a solution to a “proof of work”, and consider that
checking the validity of a solution is negligible. A “proof
of work” given the block h−1 and message m is to find a
string η such that H(h−1, η,m) ≤ Dp, where the blockchain
protocol sets Dp such that the probability of finding η to satisfy
the above relation is p. This quantity p is referred to as the
hardness of the proof of work.
Given the above, we now describe an execution of a
blockchain protocol. At the beginning, the environment Z(1κ)
instantiate n players, which have identical computing power.
The protocol proceeds in rounds as follows. At each round,
each player i does the following:
• i receives blocks created by other players and includes the
blocks in its chain based on the protocol Π;
• i can make at most one query to the oracle H and creates a
block with probability p; and
• i receives some message from Z(1κ) and includes the mes-
sage in the block that i tries to publish, where the message
contains transactions to be included in the blockchain.
As already noted, ν denotes the fraction of corrupted
players controlled by the adversary. With µ being the fraction
of honest players, we have
µ+ ν = 1. (1)
Throughout the paper, we enforce
0 < ν <
1
2
< µ, (2)
and the trivial condition
n ≥ 4. (3)
From Eq. (1), Inequality (2) simply means the following two
conditions:
i) the fraction of computational power controlled by benign
miners is greater than that controlled by the adversary; and
ii) the adversary controls non-zero fraction of computational
power.
With n, p, µ, and ν introduced above, we now define α, α,
and α1, which will be used in our theorems to be presented in
Section IV. All these notation are given in Table I on Page 2.
The meanings of α, α, and α1 are as follows:
α : the probability that some honest miner,
succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round, (4)
α : the probability that no honest miner,
succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round, (5)
α1 : the probability that only one honest miner,
succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round. (6)
Next, we derive the expressions of α, α, and α1. Since each
honest node mines a block independently with probability p
in a round, X denoting the number of blocks mined by the
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µn honest nodes in each round follows binom(µn, p), which
denotes a binomial distribution with µn being the number of
trials and p being the success probability for each trial. Hence,
we have
α = P [X = 0] = 1− (1 − p)µn, (7)
α = P [X > 0] = 1− α = (1 − p)µn, (8)
α1 = P [X = 1] = pµn× (1 − p)µn−1. (9)
IV. OUR RESULTS FOR THE CONSISTENCY PROPERTY OF
NAKAMOTO’S BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOL
Our results for the consistency property of Nakamoto’s
blockchain protocol are presented as Theorems 1 and 2 below.
From [3], [6], blockchain consistency is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Blockchain consistency). Nakamoto’s
blockchain protocol satisfies consistency if for any positive
integer T , with at least 1−O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )) probability,
for any two rounds r and s with r < s, all but the last T
blocks in the chain of any honest player i at round r is a
prefix of the chain of any honest player j at round s.
The asymptotic notation in this paper such as O (·)
and Ω (·) is standard1; see Footnote 1. The term2
O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )) above decays at least exponentially with
respect to T . Intuitively, the above consistency notion implies
that there is at least 1−O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )) probability for
the event that honest players agree on the current chain, except
for T “unconfirmed” blocks at the end of the chain.
Based on Definition 1, Lemma 1 below presents a sufficient
condition for consistency which we will use to prove our
theorems.
Lemma 1 (Blockchain consistency). Nakamoto’s blockchain
protocol satisfies consistency if for any positive integer T , in
a window of T slots, there is at least 1−O(1) · exp (−Ω (T ))
probability for the event that the number of convergence
opportunities is greater than the number of blocks mined by the
adversary, where a convergence opportunity is an event which
results in all honest players to agree on a single longest chain.
Theorem 1. Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol satisfies consis-
tency if there exists a positive constant δ1 such that
α2∆α1 ≥ (1 + δ1)pνn, (10)
where α (resp., α1) denotes the probability that no (resp., only
one) honest miner succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round,
and is given by Eq. (8) (resp., Eq. (9)).
Theorem 2. Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol satisfies con-
sistency when there exist constants ǫ1 and ǫ2 satisfying
1Given two positive sequences fT and gT indexed by T , we have
• fT = O (gT ) means that there exist positive constants c1 and T1 such
that fT ≤ c1gT for all t ≥ T1.
• fT = Ω (gT ) means that there exist positive constants c2 and T2 such
that fT ≥ c2gT for all t ≥ T2.
2Actually 1− O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )) can be simplified as 1−exp (−Ω (T ))
since O(1) · exp (−Ω(T )) = exp (lnO(1)− Ω (T )) and lnO(1)−Ω (T )
can also be written −Ω (T ).
0 < ǫ1 < 1 and ǫ2 > 0 such that c denoting
1
pn∆ satisfies
c ≥ max
{(
2µ
ln µν
+
1
∆
)
1 + ǫ2
1− ǫ1 ,
(ln µν + 1)µ
ǫ1∆ ln
µ
ν
}
. (11)
To better understand Inequality (11), we present the following
result, which we will use in Remark 1 to show that Inequal-
ity (11) specifies c to be just slightly greater than 2µln(µ/ν) .
If there exist positive constants δ1 and δ2 satisfying
δ1 + δ2 < 1 such that
1
1 + exp(∆δ1)
≤ ν ≤ 1
1 + exp
(
1
∆δ2−1
) , (12)
we can write Inequality (11) as
c ≥ 2µ
ln(µ/ν)
· (1 + ǫ2) · 1 + ∆
δ1−1
1−∆δ1+δ2−1 . (13)
Remark 1. We now explain that Inequality (13) enforces
c to be just slightly greater than 2µln(µ/ν) for ν satisfying
Inequality (12), which will be shown to cover most ν ∈ (0, 12 ).
Here we consider ∆ = 1013 which is used in Figure 1 of
Pass et al. [3], a seminal work on the consistency property of
Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol, but our discussions readily
apply to other values of ∆. We consider two sets of δ1 and δ2
values which cover slightly different ranges of ν.
• For ∆ = 1013 of [3], we let δ1 = 16 and δ2 = 12 so that
Inequalities (12) and (13) become
10−63 ≤ ν ≤ 0.5− 10−7, (14)
and
c ≥ 2µ
ln(µ/ν)
· (1 + ǫ2) ·
(
1 + 5× 10−5) . (15)
Inequalities (14) and (15) mean that c just needs to be
slightly greater than 2µln(µ/ν) for 10
−63 ≤ ν ≤ 0.5 − 10−7,
since the positive constant ǫ2 in Inequality (15) can be
arbitrarily small.
• Inequality (14) in the above case considers 10−63 ≤ ν ≤
0.5− 10−7. Below we increase the upper bound for ν from
0.5−10−7 in Inequality (14) to 0.5−10−9 in Inequality (16)
by increasing δ2 from
1
2 above to
2
3 here. After increasing
δ2, to ensure that the term
1+∆δ1−1
1−∆δ1+δ2−1 in Inequality (13) is
still just slightly greater than 1, we slightly decrease δ1 from
1
6 above to
1
8 here, which increases the lower bound for ν
from 10−63 in Inequality (14) to 10−18 in Inequality (16).
Specifically, for ∆ = 1013 of [3], we let δ1 =
1
8 and δ2 =
2
3
so that Inequalities (12) and (13) become
10−18 ≤ ν ≤ 0.5− 10−9, (16)
and
c ≥ 2µ
ln(µ/ν)
· (1 + ǫ2) ·
(
1 + 2× 10−3) . (17)
Inequalities (16) and (17) mean that c just needs to be
slightly greater than 2µln(µ/ν) for 10
−18 ≤ ν ≤ 0.5 − 10−9,
since the positive constant ǫ2 in Inequality (15) can be
arbitrarily small.
Theorems 1 and 2 are proved in Sections V and VI,
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respectively. Below, we discuss the novelties of Theorems 1
and 2.
Novelty of our Theorem 2. The analysis and results of our
Theorem 2 are both novel. Moreover, with Inequality (14)
considering 10−63 ≤ ν ≤ 0.5 − 10−7 and Inequality (16)
considering 10−18 ≤ ν ≤ 0.5− 10−9, we summarize Inequal-
ities (14)–(17) to know that
to ensure the consistency property of Nakamoto’s
blockchain protocol, c denoting
1
pn∆
just needs to be
slightly greater than
2µ
ln(µ/ν)
for most ν ∈ (0, 1
2
).
Our paper is the first one in the literature to derive such a
neat expression 2µln(µ/ν) .
Novelty of our Theorem 1. Our Theorem 1 is also novel in
the sense its result as Inequality (10) has not been presented in
any related work. Although a recent study by Kiffer et al. [6]
also adopts a Markov-chain based approach that our Theorem 1
uses, our Theorem 1 differentiates from [6] in the following
aspects as we will discuss:
• First, [6] does not use the following two Markov chains
which we propose for the first time and use to prove our
Theorem 1:
① a Markov chain which models the transition of a variable
denoting the suffix of the concatenation of the previous
states and the current state,
② a Markov chain modeling the transition of a variable
which denotes the concatenation of i) the suffix of previ-
ous states before the ∆ to last state, ii) the previous ∆
states, and iii) the current state.
• Second, the analysis of [6] has minor errors and is more
difficult to understand than our proof for Theorem 1. In [6],
the computations of ℓ11 and ℓ10 (defined on Page 7 of [6])
are incorrect. Specifically, 1µp therein should be
1
α (i.e.,
1
1−(1−p)µn ).
• Third, [6] does not present the Inequality result (10) of our
Theorem 1. A result given as Inequality (1) in [6] looks
similar to our (10), but is incorrect due to the incorrect
computations of ℓ11 and ℓ10 noted above. Also, the Markov
chain in Figure 2 on Page 6 of [6] has only two states and
cannot cover all possible states.
In addition, after obtaining an incorrect result similar to
our (10), [6] does not analyze its result to provide a more
understandable bound for c as our Theorem 2 does. Our proof
of moving from Theorem 1 to Theorem 2 in Section VI is
quite involved.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We will show in Section V-A that Inequality (10) of
Theorem 1 is the same as
E [C(t0, t0 + T − 1)] ≥ (1 + δ1) · E [A(t0, t0 + T − 1)] .
(18)
Here we discuss the intuition of requiring Inequality (18),
which then gives Inequality (10). First, we will prove that
the probability of C(t0, t0 + T − 1) being a constant factor
smaller than its expectation E [C(t0, t0 + T − 1)] is exponen-
tially small in T . Formally, for any positive constant δ2 < 1,
we have
P [C(t0, t0 + T − 1) ≤ (1− δ2) · E [C(t0, t0 + T − 1)]]
≤ O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )) . (19)
Second, we will prove that the probability of A(t0, t0 + T − 1)
being a constant factor greater than its expectation
E [A(t0, t0 + T − 1)] is exponentially small in T . Formally,
for any positive constant δ3, we have
P [A(t0, t0 + T − 1) ≥ (1 + δ3) · E [A(t0, t0 + T − 1)]]
≤ O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )) . (20)
In Inequalities (19) and (20), the term O(1) is with respect
to T .
Via a union bound to combine Inequalities (19) and (20),
(C(t0, t0 + T − 1) ≤ (1− δ2) · E [C(t0, t0 + T − 1)]) ∪
(A(t0, t0 + T − 1) ≥ (1 + δ3) · E [A(t0, t0 + T − 1)])
happens with probability no greater than the result of summing
the bounds in the right hand side (RHS) of Inequalities (19)
and (20), which can also be written as O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )).
Then we have (at least) 1−O(1) · exp (−Ω (T ))
probability for the above union event’s complement,
(C(t0, t0 + T − 1) > (1− δ2) · E [C(t0, t0 + T − 1)]) ∩
(A(t0, t0 + T − 1) < (1 + δ3) · E [A(t0, t0 + T − 1)]), which
implies that C(t0, t0 + T − 1)−A(t0, t0 + T − 1) is greater
than
(1−δ2) · E [C(t0, t0+T−1)]− (1+δ3) · E [A(t0, t0+T−1)] .
(21)
From Inequality (18), we bound the term in (21) by
(21) ≥ [(1 − δ2) · (1 + δ1)− (1 + δ3)] · E [A(t0, t0 + T − 1)] .
(22)
Then to obtain the desired result that
C(t0, t0 + T − 1)−A(t0, t0 + T − 1) is Ω(T ) with
probability 1− O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )), we select positive
constants δ2 < 1 and δ3 such that the term in (22) is Ω(T ). It
will become clear from Eq. (27) that A(t0, t0+T − 1) can be
written as Ω(T ), so we select positive constants δ2 < 1 and
δ3 such that [(1− δ2) · (1 + δ1)− (1 + δ3)] appearing in (22)
is a positive constant. To this end, we set
δ2 := 1− (1 + δ1)−1/3,
δ3 := (1 + δ1)
1/3 − 1, (23)
so that Inequality (22) becomes
(21) ≥ [(1 + δ1)2/3 − (1 + δ1)1/3] · E [A(t0, t0 + T − 1)] .
(24)
Summarizing the above, we have
If Inequalities (18) (19) and (20) hold, then
C(t0, t0 + T − 1)−A(t0, t0 + T − 1) is greater than[
(1 + δ1)
2/3 − (1 + δ1)1/3
] · E [A(t0, t0 + T − 1)]
with probability 1−O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )). (25)
In the rest of this section, we will first prove in Sec-
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Δ-1 number of a  {1, …, Δ-1}
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H
Fig. 2: The suffix-of-previous-and-current-states Markov chain CF , which models the transition of a variable denoting the suffix
of the concatenation of the previous states and the current state.
tion V-A that Inequality (10) of Theorem 1 is the same as
Inequality (18). It will also become clear in Section V-A
that A(t0, t0 + T − 1) can be written as Ω(T ). Then we
prove Inequalities (19) and (20) in Sections V-B and V-C. In
Section V-D, we combine the results of Sections V-B and V-C
with (25) to complete the proof of to Theorem 1.
A. Proving that Inequality (10) is the same as Inequality (18)
Recall Inequality (10) of Theorem 1 is
α2∆α1 ≥ (1 + δ1)pνn. To show Inequality (18), we will
explain
E [C(t0, t0 + T − 1)] = T α2∆α1, (26)
and
E [A(t0, t0 + T − 1)] = Tpνn, (27)
We first show Eq. (27). Since the adversary controls
νn nodes and each node mines a block independently with
probability p in each round, the number of blocks mined (by
νn nodes controlled) by the adversary in each round follows
binom(νn, p), which denotes a binomial distribution with νn
being the number of trials and p being the success probability
for each trial. Then A(t0, t0 + T − 1) denoting the number of
blocks mined the adversary in the T rounds from round t0 to
t0 + T − 1 is the sum of T indepdendent random variables,
each of which obeys binom(νn, p). Hence, A(t0, t0 + T − 1)
follows binom(Tνn, p). Then Eq. (27) clearly follows.
We now present the proof Eq. (26), which is quite involved.
In each round, one of the following events will happen:
i) H , which means that at least one block is mined by the
benign (i.e., honest) nodes, and ii) N , which means that no
block is mined by the benign nodes. By a round’s state, we
refer to whether H or N happens, and we know from the
definitions of α and α in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) that H (resp., N )
happens with probability α (resp., α). Then we define State-Set
to characterize the possible values that a round’s state can take:
State-Set := {H, N}. (28)
Let St be the random variable representing the state at round
t. We will use st ∈ State-Set as an instantiation of St.
We consider a Markov chain CF for the suffix of all the
states in all rounds up to round t, where “F ” means suffix. We
will explain that Figure 2 can represent this Markov chain. To
avoid confusion, we use “F ” instead of “S” since the symbol
S is used to represent the state at a round. We will call CF
as the suffix-of-previous-and-current-states Markov chain. At
round t, let random variable F t represent the suffix of the
states in all rounds up to round t; i.e., F t represents the vertex
visited at round t in the Markov chain CF .
After at least two H have happened by round t (which
holds for sufficiently large t), we will explain below that we
can characterize all possible F t by the following 2∆+1 values
which form the Suffix-Set:
Suffix-Set :=
{
HN≤∆−1H, HN≤∆−1HNa,
HN≥∆, HN≥∆HNb
∣∣∣ a∈{1,...,∆−1},
b∈{0,...,∆−1}
}
.
(29)
In (29), the term N≤∆−1 means a series of N which has at
most ∆− 1 number of consecutive N ; i.e., zero N (i.e., null),
one N , . . ., or ∆ − 1 number of N . Similarly, N≥∆ means
a series of N which has at least ∆ number of consecutive
N , while Na (resp., N b) means a (resp., b) number of
consecutive N . Supposing ∆ = 3 for the purpose of giving
an example (practical ∆ is much larger) and the states from
round 1 to round 10 are H,N,H,H,N,N,H,N,N,N , then
the corresponding F 7,F 8,F 9, and F 10 (i.e., F t at time
t = 7, 8, 9, and 10) are HN≤∆−1H , HN≤∆−1HNa with
a = 1, HN≤∆−1HNa with a = 2, and HN≥∆ (HN≥3
covers HN3), respectively.
To see why we can characterize all possible F t by (29), we
discuss the following cases, where we recall that Si represents
the state at round i:
• If St isH and St−1 isH , then we can set F t asHN≤∆−1H
which covers HH when “N≤∆−1” becomes 0 number of
N (i.e., null);
• If St is H and St−1 is N , as we consider that at least two
H have happened by round t (which holds for sufficiently
large t), suppose the previous H closest to round t happens
at round t− c for some c > 0. In other words, St−c and St
are H while Si for each i ∈ {t − c + 1, . . . , t − 1} is N
so that the series St−c . . . St can be written as HN c−1H .
Then if c − 1 ≤ ∆ − 1, we can set F t as HN≤∆−1H ; if
c − 1 ≥ ∆, we can set F t as HN≥∆HN b which covers
HN≥∆H when b takes 0.
• If St is N , as we consider that at least two H have happened
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by round t (which holds for sufficiently large t), suppose the
H closest to and before round t happens at round t− d for
some d > 0. In other words, St−d is H while Si for each
i ∈ {t − d + 1, . . . , t} is N so that the series St−d . . . St
can be written as HNd. Then we have the following two
subcases:
◦ If d ≥ ∆, we can set F t as HN≥∆.
◦ If d ≤ ∆− 1, given that St−d . . . St is HNd, we further
discuss the states before round t − d. Again, since we
consider that at least two H have happened by round t
(which holds for sufficiently large t), suppose the previous
H closest to round t−d happens at round t−f for some
f > d. In other words, St−f is H while Si for each i ∈
{t−f+1, . . . , t−d−1} is N so that the series St−f . . . St
can be written as HNf−d−1HNd. Recalling this subcase
discusses d ≤ ∆ − 1, if f − d− 1 ≤ ∆− 1, we can set
F t as HN
≤∆−1HNa for a = d ∈ {1, . . . ,∆ − 1}; if
f − d− 1 ≥ ∆, we can set F t as HN≥∆HN b for b =
d ∈ {1, . . . ,∆− 1}.
In Figure 2 on Page 6, we plot the transition of F t in the
suffix-of-previous-and-current-states Markov chain CF , which
is time-homogeneous, irreducible, and ergodic. In particular,
from [6], [18], time-homogeneous means that the transition
does not depend on the time; irreducible means getting to any
state from any other state has non-zero probability; and ergodic
means that each state has a positive mean recurrence time and
is aperiodic (i.e., the period is 1).
As illustrated in Figure 2, the transition rules in the Markov
chain CF are as follows:
① First, for any a ∈ {1, . . . ,∆ − 1}, the event that F t at
time t is HN≤∆−1HNa can only result from that F t−1
at time t − 1 is HN≤∆−1HNa−1, which by a recursive
argument can only result from that F t−a at time t − a is
HN≤∆−1H . Moreover, moving from F t−a = HN≤∆−1H
to F t = HN
≤∆−1HNa requires that Si for each i ∈ {t−
a+ 1, . . . , t} is N .
② Second, for any b ∈ {0, . . . ,∆ − 1}, the event that F t at
time t isHN≥∆HN b can only result from that F t−1 at time
t−1 is HN≥∆HN b−1, which by a recursive argument can
only result from that F t−b at time t − b is HN≥∆H , and
also F t−b−1 at time t− b−1 is HN≥∆. Moreover, moving
from F t−b−1 = HN≥∆ to F t = HN≥∆HN b requires
that St−a is H , and also Si for each i ∈ {t− a+ 1, . . . , t}
is N .
③ Third, the event that F t at time t is HN
≤∆−1H can result
from the combination of the following two events: i) F t−1
at time t − 1 is HN≤∆−1H or HN≤∆−1HNa for a ∈
{1, . . . ,∆ − 1} or HN≥∆HN b for b ∈ {0, . . . ,∆ − 1};
and ii) St is H .
④ Fourth, the event that F t at time t is HN
≥∆ can result from
the combination of the following two events: i) F t−1 at time
t− 1 is HN≥∆ or HN≤∆−1HN∆−1 or HN≥∆HN∆−1;
and ii) St is N .
We now derive the stationary distribution of the suffix-of-
previous-and-current-states Markov chain CF . To this end, we
first analyze the state transition in CF .
Let st be f t’s state in round t. We define a function
suffix(·) such that (F t−1 = f t−1)∩ (St = st) produces F t =
suffix(f t−1||st). Then we have
P [F t = f t]
=
∑
f t−1∈Suffix-Set:
suffix(f t−1||st)=ft
P
[(
F t−1 = f t−1
) ∩ (St = st)]
=
∑
f t−1∈Suffix-Set:
suffix(f t−1||st)=ft
(
P
[
F t−1 = f t−1
]
P [St = st]
)
, (30)
where the last step uses the independence between(
F t−1 = f t−1
)
and (St = st).
Based on Eq. (30), we now set f t as each vertex of Markov
chain CF to obtain the specific transition rules.
Case of f t in Eq. (30) being HN
≤∆−1HNa. We
obtain from Eq. (30) and the above result ① that for any
a ∈ {1, . . . ,∆− 1},
P
[
F t = HN
≤∆−1HNa
]
= P
[
F t−a = HN≤∆−1H
] t∏
i=t−a+1
P [Si = N ]
= P
[
F t−a = HN≤∆−1H
] · αa, (31)
where the last step uses P [Si = N ] = α.
Case of f t in Eq. (30) being HN
≥∆HN b. We obtain
from Eq. (30) and the above result ② that for any b ∈
{0, . . . ,∆− 1},
P
[
F t = HN
≥∆HN b
]
= P
[
F t−b−1 = HN≥∆
]
P [St−b = H ]
t∏
i=t−b+1
P [Si = N ]
= P
[
F t−b−1 = HN≥∆
] · α · αb, (32)
where the last step uses P [St−b = H ] = α and P [Si = N ] =
α.
Case of f t in Eq. (30) being HN
≤∆−1H . We obtain
from Eq. (30) and the above result ③ that
P
[
F t = HN
≤∆−1H
]
= P [St = H ] ·
(
P
[
F t−1 = HN≤∆−1H
]
+
∆−1∑
a=1
P
[
F t−1 = HN≤∆−1HNa
]
+
∆−1∑
b=0
P
[
F t−1 = HN≥∆HN b
])
= α ·
(
P
[
F t−1 = HN≤∆−1H
]
+
∆−1∑
a=1
P
[
F t−1 = HN≤∆−1HNa
]
+
∆−1∑
b=0
P
[
F t−1 = HN≥∆HN b
])
, (33)
where the last step uses P [St = H ] = α.
7
Case of f t in Eq. (30) being HN
≥∆. We obtain from
Eq. (30) and the above result ④ that
P
[
F t = HN
≥∆]
= P [St = N ] ·
(
P
[
F t−1 = HN≥∆
]
+ P
[
F t−1 = HN≤∆−1HN∆−1
]
+ P
[
F t−1 = HN≥∆HN∆−1
])
= α ·
(
P
[
F t−1 = HN≥∆
]
+ P
[
F t−1 = HN≤∆−1HN∆−1
]
+ P
[
F t−1 = HN≥∆HN∆−1
])
, (34)
where the last step uses P [St = N ] = α.
Below we analyze the stationary distribution of the Markov
chain CF . For f ∈ Suffix-Set, we let πF (f ) be the stationary
probability of vertex f , where Suffix-Set is given by Eq. (29);
i.e.,
πF (f) = lim
t→∞P [F t = f ] . (35)
Summarizing Eq. (31)–(34), to derive Markov chain CF ’s
stationary distribution denoted by πF , we obtain

πF (HN
≤∆−1HNa) = πF (HN≤∆−1H) · αa, (36a)
∀a ∈ {1, . . . ,∆− 1},
πF (HN
≥∆HN b) = πF (HN≥∆) · α · αb, (36b)
∀b ∈ {0, . . . ,∆− 1},
πF (HN
≤∆−1H) = α ·
(
πF (HN
≤∆−1H)
+
∆−1∑
a=1
πF (HN
≤∆−1HNa)+
∆−1∑
b=0
πF (HN
≥∆HN b)
)
,(36c)
πF (HN
≥∆) = α ·
(
πF (HN
≥∆)
+πF (HN
≤∆−1HN∆−1) + πF (HN≥∆HN∆−1)
)
, (36d)
[
πF (HN
≤∆−1H)+
∑∆−1
a=1 πF (HN
≤∆−1HNa)
+πF (HN
≥∆)+
∑∆−1
b=0 πF (HN
≥∆HN b)
]
=1, (36e)
where Eq. (36a)–(36d) are from Eq. (31)–(34), respectively,
and Eq. (36e) simply means that the stationary probabilities of
all the states sum to 1.
From Eq. (36a)–(36e), we derive that

πF (HN
≤∆−1H) = α · (1− α∆), (37a)
πF (HN
≤∆−1HNa) = α · (1 − α∆) · αa, (37b)
∀a ∈ {1, . . . ,∆− 1},
πF (HN
≥∆) = α∆, (37c)
πF (HN
≥∆HN b) = α · α∆+b, (37d)
∀b ∈ {0, . . . ,∆− 1}.
We now use the suffix-of-previous-and-current-states
Markov chain CF to construct another Markov chain. For
notational purpose, we let P stand for St−∆ . . . St, which
are states in the previous ∆ rounds and the state in the
current round t. Then we consider a Markov chain to represent
the transition of F t−∆−1St−∆ . . . St, and denote this Markov
chain by CF ||P , where “||” intuitively means concatenation.
The random variable F t−∆−1 represents the suffix of the states
in all rounds up to round t − ∆ − 1, so F t−∆−1St−∆ . . . St
means the concatenation of i) the suffix of previous states
before the ∆ to last state, ii) the previous ∆ states, and iii)
the current state. We can see that the Markov chain CF ||P is
time-homogeneous, irreducible, and ergodic.
As it will become clear, to analyze St of
F t−∆−1St−∆ . . . St, knowing whether St is H or N is
not enough, and we need to know the exact number of blocks
mined by the honest nodes at round t in the case of St being
H (i.e., when at least one block is mined by the honest nodes
at round t). To this end, we let Hh be the event that the
honest nodes mine h number of block at round t. Then the
values that St can take is given by the following set:
Detailed-State-Set := {Hh, N | 1 ≤ h ≤ µn}. (38)
Clearly, the H state comprises all Hh states for 1 ≤ h ≤ µn.
Below we analyze the stationary distribution of the Markov
chain CF ||P . For f ∈ Suffix-Set, s(1) ∈ Detailed-State-Set, . . .,
s(∆+1) ∈ Detailed-State-Set, we let πF ||P (fs(1) . . . s(∆+1))
be the stationary probability of vertex fs(1) . . . s(∆+1), where
Suffix-Set and Detailed-State-Set are given by Eq. (38)
and (29); i.e.,
πF ||P (fs(1) . . . s(∆+1))
= lim
t→∞
P
[
F t−∆−1St−∆ . . . St = fs(1) . . . s(∆+1)
]
. (39)
Since P
[
F t−∆−1St−∆ . . . St = fs(1) . . . s(∆+1)
]
equals
P [F t−∆−1 = f ]
∏∆+1
i=1 P
[
St−∆−1+i = s(i)
]
, we obtain from
Eq. (35) and (39) that
πF ||P (fs(1) . . . s(∆+1)) = πF (f)
∆+1∏
i=1
P
[
s(i)
]
. (40)
We can also prove Eq. (40) by analyzing the Markov chain
CF ||P directly. A proof is deferred to Appendix J.
From Eq. (40), we can compute the stationary distribution
πF ||P of the Markov chain CF ||P using expressions of πF in
8
Eq. (37a)–(37d) and the following Eq. (41):
P
[
s(i)
]
=


(
µn
h
)
ph(1− p)µn−h, if s(i) = Hh,
for each h satisfying 1 ≤ h ≤ µn,
α, for α = (1− p)µn, if s(i) = N.
(41)
Eq. (41) follows from the result that since each honest node
mines a block independently with probability p in a round, the
number of blocks mined by the µn honest nodes in each round
follows binom(µn, p), which denotes a binomial distribution
with µn being the number of trials and p being the success
probability for each trial.
We now explain that when we have
(
f = HN≥∆
) ∩(
s(1) = H1
) ∩ (s(2) = . . . = s(∆+1) = N), the F ||P state
fs(1) . . . s(∆+1), which we write as HN≥∆||H1N∆ for nota-
tional simplicity, represents a convergence opportunity. Specif-
ically, the pattern of HN≥∆||H1N∆ means the following
consecutive events:
i) a benign node mines a block in a round,
ii) at least ∆ rounds pass in which no benign node mines a
block, which means that at the end of the ∆ rounds, all
benign nodes know all benign blocks and hence agree on
the maximum length of the chain (they may not agree on
the same chain),
iii) a benign node mines a block B in a new round and thus
extends a chain by one more block than the longest chain
of the previous round, and
iv) ∆ rounds pass in which no benign node mines a block.
Therefore, at the end, all honest miners know the new block
B and agree on the single longest chain as the one having
B.
Then we compute the stationary probability of the F ||P state
fs(1) . . . s(∆+1) state being HN≥∆||H1N∆ as follows by
using Eq. (40):
πF ||P (HN
≥∆||H1N∆) = πF (HN≥∆)P [H1] (P [N ])∆ .
(42)
From Eq. (41), it holds that
P [H1] = α1 for α1 := pµn× (1− p)µn−1. (43)
From Eq. (37c) and Eq. (43), we obtain
πF ||P (HN≥∆||H1N∆) = α∆ · α1 · α∆ = α2∆α1. (44)
We define ft as the indicator function that the visited vertex
at time t is the state HN≥∆||H1N∆. For the T -step random
walk on the Markov chain CF ||P in the T rounds from round
t0 to t0 + T − 1, let the visited vertices be Vt0 , . . . , Vt0+T−1.
Then from Eq. (44), we have that for t ∈ {t0, . . . , t0+T −1}:
• ft(Vt) equals 1 if Vt is the state HN≥∆||H1N∆, which
happens with probability α2∆α1;
• ft(Vt) equals 0 if Vt is not the state HN≥∆||H1N∆, which
happens with probability 1− α2∆α1.
Then the expectation of the binary variable ft(Vt) is
E [ft(Vt)] = α
2∆α1. (45)
With C(t0, t0 + T − 1) being the number of times that
HN≥∆||H1N∆ is visited (i.e., the number of convergence
opportunities) in the T rounds from round t0 to t0 + T − 1,
we have
C(t0, t0 + T − 1) =
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
ft(Vt). (46)
From the above discussion, the random variables
ft(Vt)|t0+T−1t=t0 are identically distributed, but are not indepen-
dent. Since the linearity of expectation holds regardless of
whether the random variables are independent, we use Eq. (45)
to obtain
E [C(t0, t0 + T − 1)] =
t0+T−1∑
t=t0
E [ft(Vt)] = T α
2∆α1;
i.e., Eq. (26) is proved.
Using Eq. (26) and Eq. (27) which we have both shown,
we know that Inequality (10) is the same as Inequality (18).
In the next subsection, we will show that C(t0, t0 + T − 1)
is in fact concentrated around its expectation with high prob-
ability.
B. Proving Inequality (19)
Recall from the previous subsection that the T -step random
walk on the Markov chain CF ||P in the T rounds from round
t0 to t0 + T − 1 visits vertices Vt0 , . . . , Vt0+T−1. Let φ be
the initial distribution of the random walk; i.e., φ represents
the distribution at round t0. Also recall that the Markov
chain CF ||P is time-homogeneous, irreducible, and ergodic.
Let τ(ǫ, α,∆) be the ǫ-mixing time of CF ||P , for 0 < ǫ ≤ 1/8.
With ft(Vt) and C(t0, t0 + T − 1) defined above, we use
Theorem 3.1 of Reference [19] on the Chernoff–Hoeffding
bounds for Markov chains to obtain the existence of a positive
constant c independent of T, n, p, µ,∆ such that
P [C(t0, t0 + T − 1) ≤ (1− δ2) · E [C(t0, t0 + T − 1)]]
≤ c‖φ‖π exp
(
− δ2
2T α2∆α1
72τ(ǫ, α,∆)
)
, for constant 0 < δ2 < 1,
(47)
where ‖φ‖π, denoting the π-norm of the vector φ, is given by
‖φ‖π :=
√√√√ ∑
(f ||p)∈Domain(F ||P )
(φF ||P (f ||p))2
πF ||P (f ||p))
,
where Domain(F ||P ) := Suffix-Set×(Detailed-State-Set)∆+1
since Markov chain CF ||P represents the transition of
F t−∆−1St−∆ . . . St. The term T α2∆α1 in Inequality (47)
comes from Eq. (26). We can also use Theorem 3.1 of
Reference [19] to compute a bound for the tail probability
P [C(t0, t0 + T − 1) ≥ (1 + δ2) · E [C(t0, t0 + T − 1)]]. We
do not present the result here since it is not needed.
Proposition 1 below provides an upper bound for ‖φ‖π.
Proposition 1. We have ‖φ‖π ≤ 1√minπF ||P , where
min πF ||P denotes the minimal value among πF ||P
and is given by α · α∆−1 · min{1− α∆, α∆} ·
(min {pµn, (1− p)µn})∆+1.
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We prove Proposition 1 in Appendix A.
From Proposition 1, ‖φ‖π is upper bounded by a term
that depends on α and ∆ (note that when α is given,
α := 1 − α is also given). Also, τ(ǫ, α,∆) denoting
the ǫ-mixing time of the Markov chain CF ||P is clearly a
non-increasing function of ǫ given α and ∆. In view of
0 < ǫ ≤ 1/8, we can select ǫ as 1/8 so that the bound
in the right hand side of Inequality (47) is maximized.
Then τ(1/8, α,∆) depends on only α and ∆. Recall from
Eq. (7) that α depends on n, p, µ. Hence, given n, p, µ,∆,
we use Inequality (47) to obtain the desired result (19) that
P [C(t0, t0 + T − 1) ≤ (1− δ2) · E [C(t0, t0 + T − 1)]] is up-
per bounded by O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )), where O(1) is with
respect to T .
C. Proving Inequality (20)
As already explained in Section V-A, A(t0, t0 + T − 1)
follows the binomial distribution binom(Tνn, p). From [20],
for a positive constant δ3, with D ((1 + δ3)p||p) denoting the
relative entropy between a Bernoulli distribution of parameter
(1 + δ3)p and a Bernoulli distribution of parameter p; i.e.,
defining
D ((1 + δ3)p||p)
:= (1 + δ3)p ln(1 + δ3) + [1− (1 + δ3)p] ln 1− (1 + δ3)p
1− p ,
(48)
we have
P [A(t0, t0 + T − 1) ≥ (1 + δ3) · E [A(t0, t0 + T − 1)]]
≤ exp (−Tνn ·D ((1 + δ3)p||p)) . (49)
Thus, given n, p, ν, we obtain the desired result (20) that
P [A(t0, t0 + T − 1) ≥ (1 + δ3) · E [A(t0, t0 + T − 1)]] is up-
per bounded by O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )), where O(1) is with
respect to T .
D. Putting things together to prove Theorem 1
We have proved in Section V-A that Inequality (10) as a
condition of Theorem 1 is the same as Inequality (18). Also,
Eq. (27) in Section V-A shows that A(t0, t0 + T − 1) can be
written as Ω(T ). We have proved Inequalities (19) and (20) in
Sections V-B and V-C. Then we combine (25) and Inequali-
ties (18) (19) (20) with the above A(t0, t0 + T − 1) = Ω(T )
to complete proving Theorem 1. 
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 2 GIVEN THEOREM 1
We decompose Inequality (11) of Theorem 2 into Inequal-
ities (50) and (51), to present Theorem 3 below.
Theorem 3. Consistency of Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol
holds in a window of T rounds with probability at least
1−O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )), when there exist constants ǫ1 and
ǫ2 satisfying 0 < ǫ1 < 1 and ǫ2 > 0 such that we have
pn ≤ ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
(ln µν + 1)µ
, (50)
and c denoting 1pn∆ satisfies
c ≥
[
2µ
ln(µ/ν)
+
1
∆
]
1 + ǫ2
1− ǫ1 . (51)
Since c denotes 1pn∆ , it is straightforward to show that
a combination of Inequalities (50) and (51) is the same as
Inequality (11), which is a condition of Theorem 2.
Section VI-A below presents the proof of Theorem 3 using
Theorem 1. In Section VI-B, we use Theorem 3 to show
Theorem 2.
A. Proof of Theorem 3 using Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 3 based on Theorem 1, we will show
that given Inequality (50), Inequality (51) implies Inequal-
ity (10). To this end, we analyze Inequality (10) through a
series of transformations. Before stating the transformations,
we note that in the rest of the paper, “⇐=”, “=⇒”, and “⇐⇒”
represent “is implied by”, “implies”, and “is equivalent to”, re-
spectively. To prove Theorem 3, we will convert Inequality (10)
in a number of steps and obtain the following results, where
we will explain soon how to set δ1 and δ4.
Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol satisfies consistency
Theorem 1⇐===== {α2∆α1 ≥ (1 + δ1)pνn} (52)
Lemma 2⇐====
{
α ≥
(
1 + δ1
1− pµn ·
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)}
(53)
Lemma 3⇐====
{
α ≥
(
1 +
δ4
2∆
)
·
(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)}
(54)
Lemma 4⇐====


c ≥ 1
n∆
{
1−
[(
1 + δ42∆
) (
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)]1/(µn)}


(55)
Lemma 5⇐====

c ≥
µ
∆
[
1− (1 + δ42∆) ( νµ)1/(2∆)
]

 (56)
Lemma 6⇐====

c ≥
µ
∆
[
1−
(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)] ·
(
1 +
δ4
ln µν − δ4
)

(57)
Lemma 7⇐====
{
c ≥
[
2µ
ln(µ/ν)
+
µ
∆
]
·
(
1 +
δ4
ln µν − δ4
)}
(58)
Lemma 8⇐====
{
c ≥
[
2µ
ln(µ/ν)
+
1
∆
]
· 1 + ǫ2
1− ǫ1
}
(i.e., Inequality (51) of Theorem 3)). (59)
The statements of Lemmas 2–8 used above are deferred to the
end of this subsection for clarity, while their proofs will be
presented in the Appendix.
Lemmas 2–8 also involve extra conditions on pn, δ1, and
δ4, which are not explicitly stated in (52)–(59). We will
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show on Page 12 that these conditions on pn are implied by
Inequality (50) of Theorem 3. To satisfy conditions on δ1 and
δ4 in Lemmas 2–8 for proving Theorem 3 (the conditions will
be discussed in detail on Page 12), we will set δ4 and δ1 as
follows:
δ4 =
(ǫ1 + ǫ2) ln
µ
ν
ǫ1 + ǫ2 + (1− ǫ1) · (ln µν + 1)
, and (60)
δ1 = (1 + δ4) ·
(
1− ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
ln µν + 1
)
− 1 with the above δ4.
(61)
We note that δ4 and δ1 in Eq. (60) and Eq. (61) are both
positive for 0 < ǫ1 < 1 and ǫ2 > 0. Clearly, δ4 > 0 since the
nominator and denominator of Eq. (60) are both positive. In
addition, given
δ4 >
(ǫ1 + ǫ2) ln
µ
ν
(ǫ1 + ǫ2) +
ǫ1+ǫ2
ǫ1
· (1− ǫ1) · (ln µν + 1)
=
ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
ǫ1 + (1− ǫ1) · (ln µν + 1)
=
ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
1 + (1− ǫ1) ln µν
, (62)
we have
δ1 = (1 + δ4) ·
(
1− ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
ln µν + 1
)
− 1
>
[
1 +
ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
1 + (1− ǫ1) ln µν
]
·
(
1− ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
ln µν + 1
)
− 1 = 0.
(63)
Below, we give intuitive explanations for a) how we obtain
the condition on pn in Inequality (50) of Theorem 3, and
b) why we set δ4 and δ1 according to Eq. (60) and (61)
in order to have (52)–(59) get through. The explanations are
just intuitive since some steps come from necessity arguments
while some other steps result from sufficiency arguments. On
Page 12, we will formally explain that enforcing the condition
on pn in Inequality (50) and setting constants δ4 and δ1
according to Eq. (60) and (61) will ensure that all conditions
of Lemmas 2–8 are satisfied.
How do we obtain the condition on pn in Inequality (50)
of Theorem 3?
In (57) and (58), we observe the expression ln µν − δ4,
which requires δ4 to be smaller than ln
µ
ν , as will become
clear in Lemmas 6 and 7. From (54), we see that Lemma 3
is used to provide
(
1+δ1
1−pµn
)1/(2∆)
≤ 1 + δ42∆ . A necessary
condition for this is
(
1
1−pµn
)1/(2∆)
< 1 + δ42∆ , for which a
sufficient condition is 11−pµn < 1+δ4 since we know from the
binomial series that 1+ δ4 <
(
1 + δ42∆
)2∆
. For δ4 < ln
µ
ν , this
implies 11−pµn < 1 + ln
µ
ν , for which a sufficient condition is
pn ≤ ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
(ln µν + 1)µ
for a constant 0 < ǫ1 < 1. (64)
This Inequality (64) is stronger than pn < 1µ used in Lemma 2.
Hence, our condition on pn is just Inequality (64), which is
exactly Inequality (50) of Theorem 3.
How do we set constants δ4 and δ1 according to Eq. (60)
and (61) to have (52)–(59) get through?
As discussed above, from (54), we see that Lemma 3
is used to provide
(
1+δ1
1−pµn
)1/(2∆)
≤ 1 + δ42∆ , for which a
sufficient condition is 1+δ11−pµn ≤ 1 + δ4 since we know from
the binomial series that 1 + δ4 <
(
1 + δ42∆
)2∆
. We have just
explained above the reasoning behind enforcing Inequality (50)
of Theorem 3; i.e., pn ≤ ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
(ln µν+1)µ
for a positive constant
ǫ1 < 1. Then a sufficient condition to ensure the existence of
positive δ1 satisfying
1+δ1
1−pµn ≤ 1 + δ4 discussed just above
is 1
1− ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
1+ln
µ
ν
< 1 + δ4, which gives δ4 >
ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
1+(1−ǫ1) ln µν . For
such δ4, the expression
(
1 + δ4ln µν−δ4
)
appearing in (58) is
greater than
[
1 +
ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
1+(1−ǫ1) ln
µ
ν
ln µν−
ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
1+(1−ǫ1) ln
µ
ν
]
=
[
1 + ǫ1(1−ǫ1)·(ln µν+1)
]
.
Then we can select δ4 such that
(
1 + δ4ln µν−δ4
)
equals[
1 + ǫ1+ǫ2(1−ǫ1)·(ln µν+1)
]
for a positive constant ǫ2. This gives δ4
by Eq. (60).
Recalling 1+δ11−pµn ≤ 1 + δ4 discussed above to produce
Lemma 3, we have 1+δ1 ≤ (1+δ4) · (1−pµn), for which we
know from Inequality (50) of Theorem 3 (i.e., pn ≤ ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
(ln µν+1)µ
for a positive constant ǫ1 < 1) that a sufficient condition is
1+ δ1 ≤ (1+ δ4) ·
(
1− ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
ln µν +1
)
. Taking “≤” here as “=” for
simplicity, we set δ1 by Eq. (61).
We now state Lemmas 2–8, which are proved in the
Appendix.
Lemma 2. Under
0 < pµn < 1, (65)
if
α ≥
(
1 + δ1
1− pµn ·
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)
, (66)
then Inequality (10) of Theorem 1 follows; i.e.,
α2∆α1 ≥ (1 + δ1)pνn.
Remark 2. The above result shows (53) under (65), where
(53) is{
α2∆α1 ≥ (1 + δ1)pνn
} Lemma 2⇐==== Inequality (66). (67)
Lemma 3. If Inequality (50) of Theorem 3 holds; i.e., if there
exists a positive constant 0 < ǫ1 < 1 such that Inequality (50)
of Theorem 3 holds, then for
δ4 >
ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
1 + (1 − ǫ1) ln µν
, (68)
and δ1 given by
δ1 = (1 + δ4) ·
(
1− ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
ln µν + 1
)
− 1, (69)
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we have δ4 > 0, δ1 > 0, and(
1 + δ1
1− pµn
)1/(2∆)
≤ 1 + δ4
2∆
. (70)
Remark 3. Inequality (70) means that under
α ≥
(
1 +
δ4
2∆
)
·
(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)
, (71)
Inequality (66) of Lemma 2 follows. Thus, under (50) and (68),
we have
Inequality (66)
Lemma 3⇐==== Inequality (71). (72)
Lemma 4. Under
0 < δ4 < ln
µ
ν
, (73)
if c denoting 1pn∆ satisfies
c ≥ 1
n∆
{
1−
[(
1 + δ42∆
) (
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)]1/(µn)} , (74)
then we have Inequality (71). Note that under Inequality (73),
the denominator in Inequality (74) is positive from Proposi-
tion 2 to be presented soon.
Remark 4. From the above result, under Inequality (73), we
have
Inequality (71)
Lemma 4⇐==== Inequality (74). (75)
Remark 5. For proving Theorem 3, we set δ4 and δ1 according
to Eq. (60) and Eq. (61) with constants 0 < ǫ1 < 1 and ǫ2 > 0,
so that (68) (69) and (73) of Lemmas 3 and 4 are satisfied,
as explained below. First, the result that Eq. (60) implies (68)
has been shown in (62). Second, Eq. (61) is the same as (69).
Finally, for δ4 in Eq. (60) with 0 < ǫ1 < 1, we have δ4 =
(ǫ1+ǫ2) ln
µ
ν
ǫ1+ǫ2+(1−ǫ1)·(ln µν +1) <
(ǫ1+ǫ2) ln
µ
ν
ǫ1+ǫ2
= ln µν , which gives (73).
Proposition 2. Under Inequality (73), we have
1−
(
1 +
δ4
2∆
)(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)
> 0.
Lemma 5. Under Inequality (73), we have
µ
∆
[
1− (1 + δ42∆)( νµ)1/(2∆)
]
≥ 1
n∆
{
1−
[(
1 + δ42∆
) (
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)]1/(µn)} , (76)
where the denominators in both sides of Inequality (76) are
positive from Proposition 2 above.
Remark 6. Inequality (76) means that if c denoting 1pn∆
satisfies
c ≥ µ
∆
[
1− (1 + δ42∆) ( νµ)1/(2∆)
] , (77)
then Inequality (74) of Lemma 4 follows. Thus, under Inequal-
ity (73), we have
Inequality (74)
Lemma 5⇐==== Inequality (77). (78)
Lemma 6. Under Inequality (73), we have
1
1−
(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆) ·
(
1 +
δ4
ln µν − δ4
)
>
1
1− (1 + δ42∆) ( νµ)1/(2∆)
.
(79)
Remark 7. Inequality (79) means that if c denoting 1pn∆
satisfies
c ≥ µ
∆
[
1−
(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)] ·
(
1 +
δ4
ln µν − δ4
)
, (80)
then Inequality (77) follows. Thus, under Inequality (73), we
have
Inequality (77)
Lemma 6⇐==== Inequality (80). (81)
Lemma 7. We have
2
ln(µ/ν)
≤ 1
∆
[
1−
(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)] ≤ 2ln(µ/ν) + 1∆ . (82)
Remark 8. Inequality (82) means that if c denoting 1pn∆
satisfies
c ≥
[
2µ
ln(µ/ν)
+
µ
∆
]
·
(
1 +
δ4
ln µν − δ4
)
, (83)
where δ4 satisfies 0 < δ4 < ln
µ
ν (i.e., Inequality (73)), then
Inequality (80) follows. Thus, under Inequality (73), we have
Inequality (80)
Lemma 7⇐==== Inequality (83). (84)
Lemma 8. For constants 0 < ǫ1 < 1 and ǫ2 > 0, with δ4 given
by Eq. (60), we have
1 +
δ4
ln µν − δ4
<
1 + ǫ2
1− ǫ1 . (85)
Remark 9. Inequality (85) means that under Inequality (60),
if c denoting 1pn∆ satisfies Inequality (51) of Theorem 3 (i.e.,
c ≥
[
2µ
ln(µ/ν) +
µ
∆
]
· 1+ǫ21−ǫ1 ), then Inequality (83) follows. Thus,
under Inequality (60), we have
Inequality (83)
Lemma 8⇐==== Inequality (51). (86)
Putting All Things Together to Prove Theorem 3. The
above results (67) (72) (75) (78) (81) (84) (86) are exactly
(53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) discussed earlier, which
along with (52) implies the desired result of Theorem 3
that consistency of Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol follows
if Inequality (51) holds, under the assumption that we enforce
all conditions of (67) (72) (75) (78) (81) (84) (86). Now we
discuss these conditions:
• (67) needs the condition (65) that Lemma 2 requires,
• (72) needs the condition (50) and (68) that Lemma 3
requires, and
• (75) (resp. (78) (81) and (84)) needs the condition (73)
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that Lemma 4 (resp. Lemma 5, Lemma 6, and Lemma 7)
requires,
• (86) needs the condition (60) that Lemma 8 requires.
Hence, to complete proving Theorem 3, we just need to
enforce (65) (68) (73) and (60) given Inequality (50) (i.e.,
pn ≤ ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
(ln µν+1)µ
) with 0 < ǫ1 < 1 and ǫ2 > 0 from Theorem 3.
To this end, we have the following:
• We obtain Inequality (65) from Inequality (50) with
0 < ǫ1 < 1, in view of pn ≤ ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
(ln µν +1)µ
< 1µ .
• After we define δ4 according to (60), we obtain Inequal-
ity (68) in view of (62), and obtain Inequality (73) in view
of δ4 =
(ǫ1+ǫ2) ln
µ
ν
(ǫ1+ǫ2)+(1−ǫ1)·(ln µν +1) <
(ǫ1+ǫ2) ln
µ
ν
(ǫ1+ǫ2)
= ln µν .
Summarizing the above, we have shown Theorem 3 using
(67) (72) (75) (78) (81) (84) (86), which hold respectively after
we prove Lemmas 2–8 in Appendices B–I. 
B. Using Theorem 3 to prove Theorem 2
For c denoting 1pn∆ , it is straightforward to show that
a combination of Inequalities (50) and (51) in Theorem 3
is the same as Inequality (11) of Theorem 2. Hence, given
Theorem 3, we know that if Inequality (11) holds, then the con-
sistency of Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol holds in a window
of T rounds with probability at least 1−O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )).
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, next we show
that under Inequality (12), we can write Inequality (11) as
Inequality (13).
From µ = 1 − ν and the condition ν ≥ 1
1+exp(∆δ1)
of
Inequality (12), we have
ln
µ
ν
= ln
1− ν
ν
≤ ln
1− 1
1+exp(∆δ1)
1
1+exp(∆δ1)
= ∆δ1 . (87)
From µ = 1 − ν and the condition ν ≤ 1
1+exp
(
1
∆δ2−1
) of
Inequality (12), we have
ln
µ
ν
= ln
1− ν
ν
≥ ln
1− 1
1+exp
(
1
∆δ2−1
)
1
1+exp
(
1
∆δ2−1
) =
1
∆δ2 − 1 ,
(88)
which implies
ln µν + 1
∆ ln µν
=
1
∆
(
1 +
1
ln µν
)
≤ ∆δ2−1. (89)
Here we set ǫ1 by
ǫ1 := ∆
δ1+δ2−1. (90)
From (87) (89) (90) and the condition δ1 + δ2 < 1, letting
ǫ1 be ∆
δ1+δ2−1, we obtain
2µ
ln µν
≥ 2µ
∆δ1
=
2µ
ǫ1
·∆δ2−1 > 2(ln
µ
ν + 1)µ
ǫ1∆ ln
µ
ν
, (91)
which means that Inequality (11) (i.e.,
c ≥ max
{(
2µ
ln µν
+ 1∆
)
1+ǫ2
1−ǫ1 ,
(ln µν+1)µ
ǫ1∆ ln
µ
ν
}
) becomes
c ≥
[
2µ
ln(µ/ν)
+
1
∆
]
1 + ǫ2
1− ǫ1 . (92)
From (89) and µ > 12 , we get
1
∆
= ∆−δ1 ·∆δ1−1 < 2µ
∆δ1
·∆δ1−1 ≤ 2µ
ln µν
·∆δ1−1, (93)
which means that a sufficient condition for (92) is
c ≥
[
2µ
ln(µ/ν)
+
2µ
ln µν
·∆δ1−1
]
1 + ǫ2
1− ǫ1
=
2µ
ln(µ/ν)
· (1 + ǫ2) · 1 + ∆
δ1−1
1−∆δ1+δ2−1 , (94)
where the last step uses (90).
The above result (94) gives Inequality (13). Hence, we have
completed proving Theorem 2. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze the consistency of Nakamoto’s
blockchain protocol. Let µ (resp., ν) be the fraction of compu-
tational power controlled by benign miners (resp., the adver-
sary), where µ+ ν = 1. With c denoting the expected number
of network delays before some block is mined, we prove
for the first time that to ensure the consistency property of
Nakamoto’s blockchain protocol in an asynchronous network,
it suffices to have c to be just slightly greater than 2µln(µ/ν) . This
expression is both neater and stronger than existing ones. In the
proof, we formulate novel Markov chains which characterize
the numbers of mined blocks in different rounds.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The π-norm of φ is
‖φ‖π =
√√√√ ∑
(f ||p)∈Domain(F ||P )
(φF ||P (f ||p))2
πF ||P (f ||p))
≤
√√√√ ∑
(f ||p)∈Domain(F ||P )
φF ||P (f ||p)
minπF ||P
=
1√
minπF ||P
, (95)
where minπF ||P denotes the minimal value among πF ||P .
Recall from Eq. (40) that
πF ||P (fs(1) . . . s(∆+1)) = πF (f )
∆+1∏
i=1
P
[
s(i)
]
. (96)
For s(i) ∈ Detailed-State-Set for Detailed-State-Set in Eq. (38),
we have
min
s(i)∈Detailed-State-Set
P
[
s(i)
]
=
{
pµn, if p ≤ 12 ,
(1− p)µn, if p > 12 ,
so that we can write
min
s(i)∈Detailed-State-Set
P
[
s(i)
]
= min {pµn, (1− p)µn} . (97)
Then Eq. (96) implies that
min πF ||P = (minπF ) · (min {pµn, (1− p)µn})∆+1 , (98)
where the minimal value among πF is
minπF = min
{
α · (1 − α∆) · α∆−1, α · α2∆−1}
= α · α∆−1 ·min{1− α∆, α∆} . (99)
Combining (95) (98) (99), we complete proving Proposi-
tion 1. 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Recall the expression of α1 in Inequality (43); i.e.,
α1 = pµn× (1 − p)µn−1. Then given the condition
0 < pµn < 1 and the result µn − 1 > 12n − 1 ≥ 1
from µ > 12 and n ≥ 4, we use Fact 2 on Page 20 of [21] to
obtain
α1 = pµn · (1− p)µn−1 ≥ pµn · [1− p · (µn− 1)]
≥ pµn · (1− pµn). (100)
Then Inequality (100) induces{
pµn · (1− pµn)α2∆ ≥ (1 + δ1)pνn
}
=⇒ {α2∆α1 ≥ (1 + δ1)pνn} . (101)
The statement pµn (1− pµn)α2∆ ≥ (1+δ1)pνn is equivalent
to α ≥
(
1+δ1
1−pµn · νµ
)1/(2∆)
; i.e., Inequality (66). This along
with Inequality (101) implies the desired result. 
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of δ4 > 0: Given δ4 >
ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
1+(1−ǫ1) ln µν with 0 < ǫ1 < 1
and ln µν > 0 from 0 < ν < µ, we have δ4 > 0.
Proof of δ1 > 0: Given δ4 >
ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
1+(1−ǫ1) ln µν and
δ1 = (1 + δ4) ·
(
1− ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
ln µν+1
)
− 1, we have
δ1 >
(
1 +
ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
1 + (1 − ǫ1) ln µν
)
·
(
1− ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
ln µν + 1
)
− 1 = 0.
Proof of
(
1+δ1
1−pµn
)1/(2∆)
< 1 + δ42∆ : Using the conditions
pn ≤ ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
(ln µν+1)µ
and δ1 = (1 + δ4) ·
(
1− ǫ1 ln
µ
ν
ln µν+1
)
− 1,
we have 1 + δ1 ≤ (1 + δ4) · (1− pµn), which means
1+δ1
1−pµn ≤ 1 + δ4. Moreover, we have 1 + δ4 <
(
1 + δ42∆
)2∆
from the binomial series. Summarizing the above results, we
obtain
(
1+δ1
1−pµn
)1/(2∆)
< 1 + δ42∆ . 
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D. Proof of Lemma 4
Recalling α = (1 − p)µn from Eq. (8), we have{
α ≥
(
1 +
δ4
2∆
)
·
(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)}
⇐⇒
{
(1− p)µn ≥
(
1 +
δ4
2∆
)
·
(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)}
⇐⇒

p ≤ 1−
[(
1 +
δ4
2∆
)(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)]1/(µn)

⇐⇒


c :=
1
pn∆
≥ 1
n∆
{
1−
[(
1 + δ42∆
) (
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)]1/(µn)}


.

E. Proof of Proposition 2
Our goal is to prove
1−
(
1 +
δ4
2∆
)(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)
> 0, (102)
given the condition 0 < δ4 < ln
µ
ν .
Clearly, Inequality (102) holds once we show
1−
(
1 +
1
2∆
ln
µ
ν
)(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)
> 0. (103)
After defining f(x) := x1/(2∆) − 12∆ lnx − 1 for x ≥ 1,
the term 1 − (1 + 12∆ ln µν )( νµ)1/(2∆) in Inequality (103)
becomes f
(
µ
ν
) · ( νµ)1/(2∆), so Inequality (103) holds once
we prove f
(
µ
ν
)
> 0. To this end, we derive f ′(x) :=
1
2x∆
(
x1/(2∆) − 1) > 0 for x > 1, so that f(x) is a strictly
increasing function for x ≥ 1. Then given f(1) = 0, we obtain
f(x) > 0 for x > 1 and thus f
(
µ
ν
)
> 0 given µν > 1. The
result f
(
µ
ν
)
> 0 means
(
µ
ν
)1/(2∆) − 12∆ ln µν − 1 > 0, which
implies Inequality (103) and thus Inequality (102). 
F. Proof of Lemma 5
First, we know from Proposition 2 that the denominators
in both sides of Inequality (76) of Lemma 5 are positive.
With A defined by
A := 1−
(
1 +
δ4
2∆
)(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)
, (104)
we know A > 0 from Proposition 2. Also, clearly A < 1. With
0 < A < 1 and µn > n2 ≥ 2 from µ > 12 and n ≥ 4, we use
Fact 2 on Page 20 of [21] to obtain (1− Aµn )µn ≥ 1− Aµn ·µn =
1−A > 0, which implies (1−A)1/(µn) ≤ 1− Aµn . Hence,
µ
A∆
=
1
n∆[1− (1−A/(µn))] ≥
1
n∆[1− (1 −A)1/(µn)] .
(105)
We plug Eq. (104) (i.e., the expression of A) into (105) and
complete proving Lemma 5. 
G. Proof of Lemma 6
We evaluate 1
1−(1+ δ42∆ )( νµ )
1/(2∆) appearing in the desired
result. We have
1
1− (1 + δ42∆) ( νµ)1/(2∆)
=
(
µ
ν
)1/(2∆)
(
µ
ν
)1/(2∆) − (1 + δ42∆)
=
[
1 +
δ4
2∆(
µ
ν
)1/(2∆) − (1 + δ42∆)
]
· 1
1−
(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆) . (106)
We further bound the term
(
µ
ν
)1/(2∆)−(1 + δ42∆) in Eq. (106):(µ
ν
)1/(2∆)
−
(
1 +
δ4
2∆
)
= exp
(
1
2∆
ln
µ
ν
)
−
(
1 +
δ4
2∆
)
> 1 +
1
2∆
ln
µ
ν
−
(
1 +
δ4
2∆
)
=
ln µν − δ4
2∆
, (107)
where the step of “>” uses exp (x) > 1+x for x > 0 as well
as ln µν > 0 from 0 < ν < µ.
Applying Inequality (107) to Eq. (106), we obtain
1
1− (1 + δ42∆) ( νµ)1/(2∆)
<
(
1 +
δ4
2∆
ln µν−δ4
2∆
)
· 1
1−
(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)
=
(
1 +
δ4
ln µν − δ4
)
· 1
1−
(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆) . (108)

H. Proof of Lemma 7
We define
λ :=
ν
µ
(109)
and for 0 < x ≤ 1,
f(x) :=
x
1− λx . (110)
Clearly, 0 < λ < 1 follows from 0 < ν < µ. Then the
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derivative of f(x) is
f ′(x) =
1− λx − x · (− lnλ)λx
(1 − λx)2 =
g(x)
(1− λx)2 , (111)
where we define g(x) as
g(x) := 1− (1 − x lnλ)λx. (112)
To analyze the sign of f ′(x) in Eq. (111), we discuss the
sign of g(x) in Eq. (112). Hence, we compute the derivative
of g(x) as g′(x) = (lnλ)2λxx > 0 for 0 < x ≤ 1, given
0 < λ < 1. Hence, g(x) strictly increases as x increases for
0 < x ≤ 1, implying g(x) > g(0) = 0 for 0 < x ≤ 1. Using
this in Eq. (111), we have f ′(x) > 0 for 0 < x ≤ 1, so that
f(x) strictly increases as x increases for 0 < x ≤ 1. Then for
any ǫ4 ∈ (0, 12∆), we have
f
(
1
2∆
)
> f(ǫ4), (113)
and
f
(
1
2∆
)
− f(ǫ4) ≤
(
1
2∆
− ǫ4
)
· max
x∈[ǫ4, 12∆ ]
f ′(x). (114)
Letting ǫ4 → 0 in Inequality (113), we obtain
f
(
1
2∆
)
≥ lim
ǫ4→0
f(ǫ4) = lim
ǫ4→0
ǫ4
1− λǫ4 . (115)
To compute limǫ4→0
ǫ4
1−λǫ4 of (115), we note that the nomi-
nator and denominator both converge to 0 as ǫ4 → 0, and are
also both differentiable for ǫ4 > 0, so we use L’Hospital’s rule
(see [22]) to obtain
lim
ǫ4→0
f(ǫ4) = lim
ǫ4→0
ǫ4
1− λǫ4 = limǫ4→0
1
−λǫ4 · lnλ =
1
ln(1/λ)
,
(116)
which together with (115) means
f
(
1
2∆
)
≥ 1
ln(1/λ)
. (117)
To analyze Inequality (114), we now check the monotonic-
ity of f ′(x). To this end, the second-order derivatives of f(x)
is
f ′′(x) =
h(x)
(1− λx)3 . (118)
where we define h(x) as
h(x) := [x ln λ(1 + λx) + 2(1− λx)]λx lnλ. (119)
To analyze the sign of f ′′(x) in Eq. (118), we discuss the
sign of h(x) in Eq. (119). Hence, we compute the derivative
of h(x) as h′(x) = lnλ[1 − (1 − x lnλ)λx] = λg(x). Given
g(x) > 0 for 0 < x ≤ 1, we have h′(x) > 0 for 0 < x ≤ 1.
Hence, h(x) strictly increases as x increases for 0 < x ≤ 1,
implying h(x) > h(0) = 0 for 0 < x ≤ 1. Using this in
Eq. (118), we obtain f ′′(x) > 0 for 0 < x ≤ 1, so that f ′(x)
strictly increases as x increases for 0 < x ≤ 1. Thus, we know
for any ǫ4 satisfying 0 < ǫ4 <
1
2∆ ≤ 12 < 1 from ∆ ≥ 1 that
max
x∈[ǫ4, 12∆ ]
f ′(x) < f ′(1) =
1− [1 + ln(1/λ)]λ
(1− λ)2 . (120)
Now we bound the nominator 1− [1+ ln(1/λ)]λ in (120). For
a lower bound, we use ln(1/λ) ≤ λ−1 − 1 given 0 < λ < 1
to obtain 1− [1+ ln(1/λ)]λ ≥ 0. For an upper bound, we use
ln(1/λ) ≥ 1−λ given 0 < λ < 1 to obtain 1−[1+ln(1/λ)]λ ≤
1− (2− λ)λ = (1− λ)2. These two bounds imply that f ′(1)
in (120) satisfies 0 ≤ f ′(1) ≤ 1. Then (120) gives
max
x∈[ǫ4, 12∆ ]
f ′(x) < 1.
which is used in Inequality (114) to induce
f
(
1
2∆
)
≤ f(ǫ4) + 1
2∆
− ǫ4. (121)
Letting ǫ4 → 0 in Inequality (121), we obtain
f
(
1
2∆
)
≤ lim
ǫ4→0
f(ǫ4) + lim
ǫ4→0
(
1
2∆
− ǫ4
)
=
1
ln(1/λ)
+
1
2∆
, (122)
where the last step uses Inequality (116).
Given λ = νµ and f
(
1
2∆
)
= 1
2∆
[
1−( νµ )
1/(2∆)
] from
Eq. (109) and Eq. (110), the combination of Inequali-
ties (117) and (122) gives the desired result
2
ln(µ/ν)
≤ 1
∆
[
1−
(
ν
µ
)1/(2∆)] ≤ 2ln(µ/ν) + 1∆ .

I. Proof of Lemma 8
For δ4 =
(ǫ1+ǫ2) ln
µ
ν
(ǫ1+ǫ2)+(1−ǫ1)·(ln µν+1) , the term
δ4
ln µν−δ4 equals
(ǫ1+ǫ2)
(1−ǫ1)·(ln µν+1) . Given 0 < ν < µ, we have ln
µ
ν > 0, which
with 0 < ǫ1 < 1 and ǫ2 > 0 gives
1 +
ǫ1 + ǫ2
(1 − ǫ1) · (ln µν + 1)
< 1 +
ǫ1 + ǫ2
1− ǫ1 =
1 + ǫ2
1− ǫ1 .
Thus, Lemma 8 is proved. 
J. Proof of Eq. (40)
P
[
F t−∆−1St−∆ . . . St = f t−∆−1st−∆ . . . st
]
=
∑
ft−∆−2∈Suffix-Set:
suffix(ft−∆−2||st−∆−1)=ft−∆−1
P
[(
F t−∆−2St−∆−1 . . . St−1 = f t−∆−2st−∆−1 . . . st−1
)
∩ (St = st)
]
= P [St = st]
∑
ft−∆−2∈Suffix-Set:
suffix(f t−∆−2||st−∆−1)=f t−∆−1
P
[
F t−∆−2St−∆−1 . . . St−1 = f t−∆−2st−∆−1 . . . st−1
]
.
(123)
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πF ||P (f t−∆−1st−∆ . . . st)
= P [St = st]×∑
ft−∆−2∈Suffix-Set:
suffix(ft−∆−2||st−∆−1)=f t−∆−1
πF ||P (f t−∆−2st−∆−1 . . . st−1).
(124)
πF ||P (f t−∆−1st−∆ . . . st)∏t
i=t−∆ P [Si = si]
=
∑
ft−∆−2∈Suffix-Set:
suffix(ft−∆−2||st−∆−1)=f t−∆−1(
πF ||P (f t−∆−2st−∆−1 . . . st−1)∏t−1
i=t−∆−1 P [Si = si]
· P [St−∆−1 = st−∆−1]
)
.
(125)
Using Eq. (30) and replacing t therein by t−∆− 1, we have
P
[
F t−∆−1 = f t−∆−1
]
=
∑
ft−∆−2∈Suffix-Set:
suffix(ft−∆−2||st−∆−1)=ft−∆−1(
P
[
F t−∆−2 = f t−∆−2
]
P [St−∆−1 = st−∆−1]
)
. (126)
From Eq. (125) and (126), the transition from
πF ||P (f t−∆−2st−∆−1...st−1)∏t−1
i=t−∆−1 P[Si=si]
to
πF ||P (ft−∆−1st−∆...st)∏t
i=t−∆ P[Si=si]
has the
same rule as the transition from πF (f t−∆−2) to πF (f t−∆−1),
so we can conclude
πF ||P (ft−∆−1st−∆...st)∏
t
i=t−∆ P[Si=si]
= πF (f t−∆−1),
which is exactly the desired result Eq. (40). 
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